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The Southern Mediterranean, as a neighbouring region for the 
European Union has received a special interest in the EU poli-
cies towards external countries, and this special interest has 
been appearing in the EU assistance given for the economic 
development of the region. The raising social tensions in the 
Mediterranean countries and the growing migratory pressure 
in recent years, however, have increased the challenges con-
nected to the region, and thus the importance of a broader 
and more complex development support as well. The European 
Investment Bank (EIB), as the European Union’s development 
bank carries out an ever-growing development lending activ-
ity in the Mediterranean. In our study we analyse the role of 
the EIB in this financing, and argue that to be able to fulfil the 
expectations concerning the future role of the institution in de-
velopment assistance, the EIB has to improve its financial as-
sistance practices.
Key words: Mediterranean countries, European Investment 
Bank, development, financial operations
INTRODUCTION
The EU’s Southern Neighbourhood1 is of utmost importance 
for the European Union, as one of the major sources of challeng-
es the EU has to face in recent years (e.g. migration, terrorism). 
1 By Southern Neighbourhood or Southern Mediterranean countries 
the study considers Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, 
Lebanon, the Palestine Authority and Syria. 
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The activities of the European Investment Bank are mainly con-
centrated in the EU Member States, but for decades, and to an 
increasing extent, it has been also supporting regions and coun-
tries outside the EU. This study examines, in particular, how the 
EIB’s financial supports contribute to the achievement of these 
European efforts towards this region.
In the first part, after a short overview of some relevant lit-
eratures the study analyses the relationship of the EU and the 
Southern Mediterranean countries: the challenges that the re-
gion poses for the EU, the institutions it created to address these 
challenges, and the extent to which these institutions are able to 
deal with the risks created by the Southern Mediterranean. The 
second part examines the priorities and the authorisation upon 
which the European Investment Bank carries out its financial 
activity, and the regions concerned by this funding outside the 
Union. The third part examines the EIB activities in the region 
in detail. Along with the presentation of the lending priorities, 
an analysis of the distribution of this lending broken down to 
countries and sectors based on statistical data is also provided. 
The cooperation of EIB with other development institutions the 
EIB in the area is also assessed. A brief evaluation of the EIB 
activities in the Southern Mediterranean concludes this study: 
the extent to which it was able to contribute effectively to the 
economic development in the region, and to the realisation of 
EU policies.
A SHORT REVIEW OF LITERATURE
There is a broad literature on the EU-Mediterranean relation-
ship, dealing with this complex issue from different points of 
view. Bruns et al. (2016) reveals the geopolitical aspects behind 
the integration: how much the EU is able to act as a geopo-
litical actor in the neighbouring regions, what kind of instru-
ments it possesses to reach it goals outside its territory. Bouris 
and Schumacher (2017) provides an excellent analysis on the 
continuities and changes in the revised Neighbourhood Policy: 
how the Arab Spring and its aftermath affected the EU policies 
and bilateral relations. Kourtelis (2015) focuses on the political 
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economic backgrounds, especially in the North-South relations: 
he reveals that the unchanged power structures in the domestic 
environment of both sides have reduced the expected efficiency 
of Euro-Med economic cooperation. 
For the purpose of our study literature that examines the 
EU financial support given to the region, its conditionality and 
effectiveness, are of special importance. Holden (2008) draws 
attention on the rewards-based conditionality of the EU’s aid 
policy towards Mediterranean countries that had been targeted 
at supporting reforms in key sectors. Ayadi and Gadi (2013) 
analyses the new priorities of assistance policy created as a reac-
tion to the events of the Arab spring, and the possible scenarios 
to handle old and new challenges. Zorob (2017) goes further by 
assessing the social and economic consequences of the EU poli-
cies in the Southern Mediterranean countries, and the impact of 
the EU assistance to improve the actual situation.
Since we are focusing on the activity of the European 
Investment Bank, the literature on international development 
banking activity has also a relevance to our topic. Multilateral 
development banks (MDBs) are in general highly valued by re-
cipient countries and they are considered more effective and 
efficient than traditional bilateral donors (Prizzon et al. 2017). 
However, the MDB model combining large-scale finance, at 
interest rates lower than countries could borrow from capital 
markets is under threat: more restrictive policies have become 
embedded in MDB management culture the influence of power-
ful shareholders—most notably the US—who are reluctant to 
take any risks that could lead to an MDB bailout (ibid.). Spantig 
(2017) investigates how the activity of international financing 
institutions has been adapted to changing challenges and requ-
irements. Here, the post-Arab-Spring Mediterranean region of-
fers a good case to analyse. 
The EIB’s general extra-EU lending activity is widely ana-
lysed in the literature. Antonowicz-Cyglicka et al. (2016) and 
Dobreva (2018) give a critical overview on the EIB external 
mandate, Lesay (2013) analyses the EIB’s external activity from 
a developmental policy approach, while Újvári (2017) discusses 
the EIB’s activity as a potential part of the EU external policy. 
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On the Mediterranean activity of the EIB, however, we can find 
only few analytical literatures. The EIB itself provides ex-post 
analysis of previous FEMIP programs (De Laat et al. 2013), but 
we hardly find more detailed analysis that puts the issue in a 
broader framework.
INSTITUTIONAL AND FINANCIAL FRAMEWORKS OF 
EURO-MED COOPERATION
The evolving European integration — due to its geographical, 
historical, political, economic and cultural connections – has 
from the outset been interested and directly involved in the se-
curity, stability and development of the countries of its southern 
neighbourhood, of those of North Africa, and of the so-called 
Levantine countries (Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Israel). While 
during the Cold War, the relations were primarily focusing on 
bilateral trade and financing agreements, from the mid-nineties 
on, the need has increased for addressing jointly the region and 
its complex problems.
The basic challenge was the fact that the economies of the 
region were not able to keep pace with the fast-increasing popu-
lation, and hence most countries had to face growing social ten-
sions due to increasing unemployment and stagnating or declin-
ing incomes. These tensions may lead to radicalisation (Islamic 
fundamentalism), civil war and increasing migratory pressure. 
In response to these challenges, the EU was looking for a com-
plex solution, the key element of which was to promote the eco-
nomic prosperity of the region. The EU’s main instrument for 
fostering these goals was the economic integration (free trade), 
which was complemented by investment sources.
The Barcelona Process, which was launched in 1995 and 
was aiming to tighten the relations between the EU and the 
Southern Mediterranean region in the framework of the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), was built on three pillars 
(political, economic, and cultural). In the framework of the 
partnership, so-called Euro-Med Association Agreements were 
concluded with the countries in the region, which over a pe-
riod of 15 years included the creation of bilateral free trade. 
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While the short- and medium-term positive wealth impact of 
these free trade agreements is highly debated (see e.g. Langan 
2015), the EMP has offered a broader financial assistance for 
the region. The MEDA (Mediterranean Economic Development 
Area) programme was established as the institution responsible 
for the financial support. MEDA I (1995-1999) disposed over 
EUR 4,422 million, while MEDA II (2000-2006) provided EUR 
5,350 millions of funding for the beneficiary countries. The fi-
nancial resources were assigned to the targets and programmes 
defined in the country-strategies (so-called national indicative 
programmes). Though the country-priorities were set together 
with the Southern partner countries, the final decision on the 
development targets was made in Brussels. The projects were 
financed mostly through the national governments, however, 
so the selection of firms and NGOs involved in the projects de-
pended on local political preferences.2 The efficiency of the fi-
nancial subsidies aiming for economic and social reforms was 
below expectations (Holden 2008).
The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), established after 
the 2004 EU enlargement, addressed the Southern and Eastern 
neighbourhood (Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, the Caucasus 
states) jointly, but the EMP still remained in a separate unit. 
The financial resources, however, were merged, and the TACIS 
(the financial fund for the Eastern countries) and the MEDA 
operated after 2007 under the common name ENPI (European 
Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument). The ENPI dis-
posed over EUR 11,200 million between 2007 and 2013. The bi-
lateral financial assistance from EU-members has well exceeded 
EU-funds. The EUR 13,803 million French support (1995-2009) 
was higher than the overall EU financing (12,758 million), but 
Germany (EUR 7,170 million), Spain (EUR 2,401million) and 
Italy (EUR 1,601million) were also important contributors 
(Ayadi-Gadi 2013, 8). 
2 It has also contributed to the negligence of some social groups, to 
the deterioration of social cohesion, and as a consequence, to a de-
creased efficiency of the subsidies. (Bicchi–Martin 2016, 144)
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On a French initiative in 2008, the Union for the 
Mediterranean (UfM) was established, which has sought to im-
prove the cooperation between the two regions on six main ar-
eas of support.3 To finance the costly infrastructural projects, 
the Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF) was established. 
The NIF was financed both by the EU budgetary funds, and by 
member states’ contributions. Between 2008 and 2016, the 
1,678 million euro of the EU budgetary support to NIF has mo-
bilized ca. 15 billion euro of investments, 60 percent of it in the 
Mediterranean neighbours (European Commission 2016, 6). 
The Arab Spring initiated in 2011, however, has led to radi-
cal changes and questioned the EU’s established relations with 
the region. The current uncertainties and the increasing role of 
the Southern Mediterranean in global migration are due to the 
failures of the economic and political processes of the region. 
The economic growth in the first decade of the 2000s was ben-
efitting mostly the elites of the societies, and unemployment, 
especially among the youth has grown very high, and thus it 
has increased social tensions. Foreign investors see most of 
the countries of the region as non-competitive due to red tape, 
high political risk and poor economic structure. Economic prob-
lems have affected even the political stability of the region: the 
authoritarian regimes, which were in power for decades, have 
weakened and completely lost their legitimacy in many coun-
tries. The sometimes-revolutionary discontent could not lead, 
however, to a satisfactory solution and the rise of radical Islam 
adds to the uncertainty in the region.
One of the most fundamental aims of the EU’s Mediterranean 
initiatives was to reduce its safety risk by improving the eco-
nomic development of the region. The reforms, however, which 
needed economic liberalisation and a fast opening of external 
trade, have posed huge economic burdens on the Southern 
countries, especially in the short term. The EU was providing a 
limited support to these reforms, due to its internal structural 
3 The six areas are: transport and urban development, water and envi-
ronment protection, energy and climate protection, social and civil 
affairs, higher education and research, and business development.
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tasks in the late 1990s and early 200as, and also due to the 
Eastern enlargement. Foreign investments that could have 
otherwise offer a solution to these specific problems (balance 
of payments, job creation) were also missing. A number of 
areas (liberalisation of services, labour mobility) are not yet, 
or only partially, included in the Euro-Med partnerships. The 
EU’s Mediterranean policy that was aimed originally to reduce 
the security risks for the EU, often has strengthened the ef-
fects contrary to this process.
As a first reaction to the events of the Arab Spring, the EU 
extended the ENPI funds with EUR 1,000 million between 
2011 and 2013 and added new priorities (Zorob 2017, 10). 
In the framework of the reform of the ENP in 2015 and of 
the EU’s Global Strategy in 2016, the Union seeks to address 
these issues in a complex manner. The Mediterranean policy 
has been refocused with a greater coherence of the European 
Union’s policies (foreign and security, development, and neigh-
bourhood policies), with providing bigger financial resources, 
with a differentiated treatment towards each country’s situa-
tion and problems and with the support of inclusive economic 
policies aiming on the one hand, at reducing social tensions 
and poverty and at creating jobs on the other. These are now 
financed by the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) 
that provides EUR 15,400 million, complemented by loans 
provided by the EIB.
THE EIB AND ITS ACTIVITIES OUTSIDE THE EU
The European Investment Bank is the EU’s long-term devel-
opment lending institution, which was established under the 
Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Community 
in 1958. The bank is owned by the EU Member States, there-
fore, its primary task is to contribute to the EU’s long-term ob-
jectives. In 2000, the EIB was complemented by the European 
Investment Fund (EIF), which provides venture capital mainly 
to SMEs and, in 2012 the EIB Institute became the new member 
of the EIB Group. The EIB has an AAA credit rating, it finances 
its loan products from the capital markets and grants loans on a 
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non-profit-making basis in the Member States and for projects 
of common interest to the Member States.4
Since 1963, the EIB has been continuously and increasingly 
supporting the EU’s external policies, which resulted in an activ-
ity that encompasses today practically all countries of the world. 
The EIB’s external lending activity aims at, in particular, the EU 
foreign policy, its neighbourhood policy and its development 
aids.
In comparison with other multilateral development banks 
(IBRD, EBRD, the African Development Bank, etc.) the EIB is 
unique in a number of respects. It is active at the same time 
both in each of the EU Member States and in the developing 
countries, with no development objective on its own, but sub-
ject to the goals set by the EU Member States and institutions. A 
significant part of its activity outside the EU is carried out under 
EU guarantee. It primarily focuses on investments and project-
funding and participates in shaping the country- or the sectoral 
strategies only to a limited extent (since the latter are taken care 
of by different EU institutional resources). Beneficiary countries 
outside the EU are not shareholders of the EIB; it grants pref-
erential loans only to a limited extent and mainly on a regional 
basis (e.g. ACP countries). It carries out its funding in develop-
ing countries with far fewer human resources than other devel-
opment banks (Steering Committee 2010, 8).
The EIB’s External Lending Mandate (ELM) operates with 
the guarantee provided for external funding by the EU budget. 
The ELM includes not only the countries participating in the en-
largement and neighbourhood policies, but also the countries of 
Latin America and Asia. A major part of the African countries 
may be granted EIB loans in the framework of a separate man-
date (the Cotonou Agreement), established for the ACP coun-
tries. In addition, the EIB grants loans through its Own Risk 
Facility (ORF) without an EU guarantee.
The need for an EU guarantee follows partly from the Statute 
of the EIB, pursuant to which it may carry out any lending 
4 See the Lisbon Treaty (TFEU 309).
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activity only under appropriate security, and the credibility of 
the bank needs to be maintained (even by loans granted to risk-
ier third countries). The guarantee was initially country-based, 
then regional and in 2007 it became general (except for the ACP 
countries to which a specific rule applies) (EC 2013, 66). From 
1997 schemes started to appear, where the EIB itself took parts 
of the risk on a regional (in the case of acceding then neighbour-
hood policy countries) or on a thematic (energy, sustainability) 
basis. In many cases they shared the risks, and hence, the politi-
cal risks were borne by the EU budget and the commercial risks 
by the EIB (covered by a third party). Since 2007 risk-sharing 
has become obligatory at each lending concerning the private 
sector. This is partly the reason why in 2011 the proportion of 
own risk loans exceeded the amount of the loans granted with 
an EU guarantee (EC 2013, 67). The EIB recommendations also 
propose the extension of own risk lending, reserving the EU 
guarantee primarily for countries with a higher risk (Steering 
Committee 2010, 21). Recent years’ experience also shows that 
the calling of guarantees is very rare. The EIB itself provides 
mostly loans (and not grants), but it offers other financial in-
struments as equity investments, guarantees and advisory ser-
vices for its clients.
In general, supported projects outside the EU focus primar-
ily on the development of the private sector, the economic and 
social infrastructure, the investments concerning climate and 
environmental protection, and those fostering regional coop-
eration. In addition, the ELM supports the foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) of EU companies. The new External Investment Plan 
(EIP) adopted in 2016 extended the former EIP with a specific 
priority: addressing the root causes of migration. On the propos-
al of the Commission, at the occasion of the mid-term review of 
the budget of the EU (MFF), the ceiling amount of the guarantee 
behind the ELM was raised from EUR 27 billion to EUR 32.3 bil-
lion. EUR 1.4 billion from the increased amount is earmarked 
for the public expenditures concerning migration in the acced-
ing and the Southern Mediterranean countries, while a further 
EUR 2.3 billion is earmarked for the private sector to support 
migration related activities (Dobreva 2018, 4). In addition, the 
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establishment of the so-called Economic Resilience Initiative 
(ERI) was also adopted. The ERI is an additional financial sup-
port tool for the countries of the same regions (Western Balkans 
and Southern Mediterranean) that can be rapidly mobilised to 
improve sustainable development and social infrastructure and 
cohesion, and thereby the economic resilience. Evaluations on 
the EIB activities highlight the importance of evaluation and 
monitoring concerning the EIB’s investment projects and pro-
pose to improve them (Steering Committee 2010: 25). These 
evaluations emphasise local consultations relating to the pro-
jects and the use of economic, social (e.g. human rights, gender 
equality) and environmental impact assessments and indica-
tors. Priority is also given to money laundering, corruption, tax 
evasion and the risk of terrorist financing (Dobreva 2018).
Of course, in the case of the EIB, projects within the European 
Union are the large majority (around 90 per cent), the remaining 
10 per cent is shared among 160 countries outside of the EU. 
This amount, however, is also significant: since the establish-
ment of the EIB, it allocated capital in an amount of EUR 120 
billion for financing projects in non-EU countries and it lends 
currently around EUR 8 billion annually for projects outside the 
EU. In the first three decades, the former colonies of the African, 
Caribbean and the Pacific regions (the so-called ACP countries) 
were the priority, however, even at that time the Mediterranean 
countries were already significant beneficiaries. In the course of 
the nineties the main target region concerning non-EU loans be-
came without doubt the Mediterranean in major part due to the 
special support of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership process 
that was taking shape at that time. From the two-thousands on, 
the acceding states took the leading role, initially those acceding 
in 2004 and 2007 from Central and Eastern Europe, and later on 
the main beneficiaries of the loans became the Western Balkans 
and Turkey. The support of the Eastern Partnership also commit-
ted significant resources, while in recent years the proportion of 
non-European (Asia, Latin America) lending has increased in or-
der to reach foreign and development policy goals. On the whole, 
the Southern Mediterranean region has received one quarter 
– that is EUR 36.5 billion – of the non-EU resource-allocations, 
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while the wider Mediterranean region (together with Turkey and 
the Western Balkans) – almost half of the funds.
Table 1: The EIB’s external funding projects per region and per periods 
(million EUR)
1959-1989 1990-1999 2000-2009 2010-2019 1959-2019
EFTA 68 1,101 1,866 1,855 4,892
Accession 
countries
982 871 17,165 22,598 41,617
Eastern 
Europe
0 0 718 11,106 11,823
Medite- 
rranean
1,533 6,137 12,543 16,421 36,526
ACP 2,806 3,299 5,551 9,901 21,557
Asia and 
Latin 
America
0 1,701 5,705 13,620 21,026
Source: EIB (2020)5
THE EIB’S ACTIVITY IN THE SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN
The Development of EIB’s involvements’
The EIB has been providing loans to the Southern Mediterranean 
countries since 1978. Over the period 1978-1995, the EU con-
cluded bilateral financial cooperation agreements with the coun-
tries of the region. The agreements that were renewed every five 
years would not only enable budgetary aid, but also EIB sup-
port to the countries of the region. Between 1978 and 1991, the 
Mediterranean countries received ECU 1,965 million, while be-
tween 1991 and 1995 on the basis of the 4th Financial Protocol 
ECU 1,300 million as loans. The New Mediterranean Policy 
adopted in 1990 guaranteed ECU 1,800 million loan volume for 
5 If otherwise not indicated, data in the tables is based on the EIB 
database (http://www.eib.org/projects/loan/list/index), sometimes 
with own calculations.
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the period of 1992 to 1996, primarily for funding regional (ECU 
1,300 million) and environmental (EUR 500 million) projects.
Under the MEDA programme, which was established by the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership process launched in Barcelona 
in 1995, in the period of 1995 to 1999, the EIB provided EUR 
4,808 million in loans from the Euro-Med programme launched 
to support EU activities in the Mediterranean, while between 
2000 and 2007, the Euro-Med II disposed over EUR 6,400 
million. In 2002, the EIB transformed the Euro-Med sup-
port framework and established the FEMIP (Facility for Euro-
Mediterranean Investment and Partnership), which has become 
the primary instrument for regional investments. Since 2003, 
in the framework of the FEMIP, the EIB provided EUR 27 bil-
lions of project funding in the region.
In 2008, the EIB also played a role in the financing of the 
initiative, called Union for the Mediterranean (UfM): it partici-
pated in the funding of three out of the six planned UfM ar-
eas. These are: the environment (reducing the pollution of the 
Mediterranean Sea), financing of alternative energy projects 
(e.g. solar reactors) and the development of transport infra-
structure (ports, motorways). In addition to the infrastructure 
projects, the Mediterranean Business Development Initiative 
was also established, which provides financial and technical as-
sistance to the micro, small and medium-sized enterprises of 
the partner countries (Joint Declaration, 2008:20.).
Over the period of 2014 to 2020, the EIB set new priorities 
for the financial aids. One of the primary objectives has become 
the support of the growth of the private sector, in addition to 
the other key areas, such as the development of the social and 
economic infrastructure, environment protection and combat-
ing climate change. The EIB launched, in particular in Morocco 
and Tunisia new, innovative programmes, which focus on the 
support of economic operators who are of paramount impor-
tance to the community with a view to increase the social impact 
of the projects. These may include, for example, job creation that 
is extremely important in the region because of its high unem-
ployment rate and the resulting negative consequences (EIB 
2015a, 15).
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EIB Supports in the Light of Statistics
If one takes a look at the division of support given at the level 
of the individual Southern Mediterranean countries, then three 
beneficiary countries stand out: Egypt (EUR 11,057 million), 
Morocco (EUR 7847 million) and Tunisia (6637 million euro). 
The three countries received 70 percent of the total financial 
support granted by EIB in the region.
Table 2: EIB projects in the individual Mediterranean countries per 
periods (EUR million), in proportion to the GDP and the population6
1978-
1989
1990-
1999
2000-
2009
2010-
2019
Total
1978-
2019
Support/ 
1000 EUR 
of GDP
Support/ 
population 
(EUR)
Algeria 200 1104 854 500 2719 17.7 63.2
Egypt 404 1293 2970 6390 11057 41.1 110.0
Israel 93 142 510 780 1525 4.4 165.8
Jordan 100 405 488 541 1524 38.8 143.8
Lebanon 40 516 742 1494 2792 53.5 410.5
Morocco 263 1620 2553 3411 7847 74.1 208.6
Palestine 0 217 68 70 356 27.3 71.2
Syria 102 20 1437 185 1744 32.6 99.7
Tunisia 272 819 2797 2750 6637 192.2 566.2
North 
Africa*
0 0 10 72 82
Mediter-
ranean*
0 0 115 187 302
Total 1533 6137 12543 16421 36526 34.2 152.3
* regional programmes
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the available data by EIB, 
UN and IMF 
6 The table compares the total support received between 1978 and 
2019 with the GDP figures and population data for 2019. The GDP 
data are based on the IMF figures, but have been converted on the 
basis of the official dollar/euro exchange rate.
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Given the very different size and level of economic develop-
ment in these countries, it is worthwhile to look at how the aid 
distributed in proportion to the population and the GDP. The 
last two columns of Table 2 show clearly that both as a share 
of GDP and of the population, Tunisia has been by far the larg-
est beneficiary: its support amounted to almost four times the 
regional average in terms of population (EUR 566 compared to 
the EUR 152 regional average), and six times in terms of GDP 
(EUR 192, while EUR 34 for the region). As regards the share per 
population, the second one was Lebanon, followed by Morocco, 
while Egypt with its 100 million inhabitants ranked only the 
6th, well below the regional average. Morocco was the second as 
a share per GDP, while Egypt received slightly above the average 
according to this comparison.
What follows is a more detailed analysis of the EIB activity 
in the region between 2003 and 2019 concerning projects re-
alised under the FEMIP. The biggest beneficiary of aids under 
the FEMIP is again Egypt (EUR 8,955 million), Tunisia (EUR 
5343 million), however, was caught up with and even surpassed 
by Morocco (EUR 5601 million).7 The three countries received 
78% of the FEMIP support, so the dominance of the three coun-
tries concerning the loans in this period is greater than that of 
the total period. 
When one takes a look at the number of approved and signed 
loan projects (Table 3), a total of 373 EIB projects have been 
launched between 2003 and 2019. On this basis, Morocco (83 
projects) was the biggest beneficiary, ahead of Egypt (70) and 
Tunisia (69). Here, however, the combined share of these three 
countries is lower than 60%, and during the 2015-2019 period 
Lebanon (20) had signed more contracts than Tunisia (19).
According to the size of the projects, however, Egypt by far 
leads the group. Between 2003 and 2019, out of the 12 larg-
est projects financed in FEMIP, eight were in Egypt. (Table 4). 
Among the largest projects in Egypt there are mostly energy and 
transport developments: power plants, refinery plants, and the 
7  These figures are also set out in Table 4.
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Metro in Cairo. More than 800 million euros was dedicated on 
the ADM motorway in Morocco, but a power plant in Syria, and 
gas pipelines in Algeria and Tunisia were also among the largest 
projects. In the last three years, two significant credit lines have 
been provided for Egypt to support the private sector and SMEs, 
intermediated by the Bank Misr and by the National Bank of 
Egypt.
Table 3: Number of projects financed by FEMIP per country and per 
periods
2003-2007 2008-2014 2015-2019 2003-2019
Algeria 4 1 0 5
Egypt 19 20 31 70
Israel 3 8 4 15
Jordan 4 9 9 22
Lebanon 11 15 20 46
Morocco 21 35 27 83
Palestine 2 2 3 7
Syria 7 9 0 16
Tunisia 22 28 19 69
Regional 9 21 9 39
Total 102 149 122 373
Source: EIB (2020)
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If one looks at the sectoral distribution of all loans, the case 
is similar (Graph 1). According to the signed contracts between 
2003 and 2019, the FEMIP was active in two priority areas of 
the UfM: 7,834 million euro (or 30%) has been dedicated to 
energy sector, while 5,022 million (or 20%) on the transport 
sector. Water and sewage projects (2,616 million euro) are also 
connected to an UfM priority, environment. After 2011, new 
priorities emerged, such as urban development and education, 
which were previously not indicated as priority areas, for the 
time being, however, they represent a rather low proportion in 
the financial aids.
Graph 1: FEMIP loans provided by sectors (only sectors with largest 
amounts of loan, cumulative value, 2003-2019, million EUR)  
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With its more than EUR 6.3 billion amount overall, credit 
lines have become the second most important area of EIB loans 
after the energy sector. It shows the increasing importance of 
SME and other private sector projects in EIB (and in a broader 
term EU) policies. 
The majority of EIB funding was still for the public sector, 
and this is particularly true in the case of large volume projects. 
This does not mean, however, that agreements with the private 
| 152 |
Tamás Szigetvári
Volume 13  |  2020  |  Number 1
sector had been totally abandoned. Beside the credit lines dedi-
cated for SMEs a number of small- and medium scale loans have 
been provided for various industrial and service sectors. In addi-
tion to loans, the EIB offered private equity capital which was an 
opportunity provided to companies in the producing sector with 
scarce capital and which was primarily used by companies of the 
industry (mainly food industry), the health sector, education, 
tourism and certain technological sectors.
Institutional Cooperation of the EIB in the Region
In order to finance FEMIP projects, the EIB has developed close 
cooperation with a number of European and international fi-
nancial institutions for the co-funding or joint support of differ-
ent projects (e.g. capacity building and new regional initiatives). 
Donors of the region have been increasingly seeking synergies 
in recent years, since the treatment of the growing security risks 
in the region requires that the effectiveness of financial aids is 
increased.
The most fundamental is, naturally, the relationship with the 
European Commission, to which the European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP) provides a framework. Since 2014, the funding 
of the ENP is guaranteed by the European Neighbourhood 
Instrument (ENI) 8, which disposes over EUR 15.4 billion over 
the current 7-year budget period for the support of the states 
of the Eastern Partnership, in addition to the Mediterranean 
countries. An additional institutional cooperation framework 
is provided by the Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF), 
which was established in 2008, primarily for the co-financing of 
expensive infrastructure projects, however, it also supports risk 
capital transactions for the private sector. 
The EIB built close cooperation with the development insti-
tutes of the Member States, too. In the framework of the NIF, the 
EIB supports projects for the improvement of water and sewage 
supply together with the French Agency for Development (AFD 
8 Between 2007 and 2014 it operated under the name of European 
Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument.
| 153 |
The European Investment Bank’s Financing Activities In The Southern Mediterranean
Volume 13  |  2020  |  Number 1
- Agence Francaise de Developpement). In 2016, for instance, a 
EUR 48 million project was realised for providing water supply of 
Syrian refugees in Jordan. Since 2015, the EIB and the German 
KfW (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau) participates jointly in the 
preparations of the Mediterranean Solar Power project, while 
with the Spanish AECID they provide funding in the form of a 
new venture capital to the countries of the region that supports 
microfinancing in the amount of EUR 100 million.
Together with the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD), the EIB supports a programme pro-
moting the trade and competitiveness of the four Southern 
Mediterranean countries that are the most active ones in terms 
of EU cooperation: Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt and Jordan. This 
EIB support is based on three complementary pillars. First, pro-
viding long-term credit lines to local financial institutions with 
a view to supporting manufacturing and food production chains 
(in 2016 this subsidy reached EUR 120 million extended by the 
same amount in local resources). Second, providing a risk-hedg-
ing instrument to local financial institutions for support SME 
lending (EUR 20 million in 2016). The third pillar provides for 
an export support tool on the one hand for SMEs – also with the 
intermediation of the financial institutions – with a view to fi-
nancing mainly export ancillary costs (planning, accounting and 
compliance with EU standards and rules, etc.) and on the other 
hand, for financial institutions with a view to offering bank-
ing services related to exports. The EIB has signed cooperation 
agreements on the coordination of development projects in the 
region with the World Bank (2004), the African Development 
Bank (2005) and the Islamic Development Bank (2012).
The Impact and Evaluation of the EIB’s activity 
The EIB with its annual funding framework totalling EUR 8 bil-
lion provides a very effective support tool that may contribute 
to the success of EU’s foreign, enlargement, neighbourhood or 
global development policy. Recent events that resulted in in-
creasing external challenges, mainly coming from the neigh-
bourhood, demanded strategic responses from the EU. And as 
we can see, these responses (e.g. the Global Strategy adopted in 
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2016) are already relying on an increasing engagement of the 
EIB in the actions to be carried out (Újvári 2017, 33). Analyses 
on the EIB’s activities and in particular on its activities in the 
Mediterranean region in recent years provided criticisms and 
suggestions in relation to the strategic and operational activity 
of the institution.
Antonowitz-Cyglicka et al. (2016) express a number of criti-
cisms concerning the EIB activity in general. One of these is 
transparency: there is hardly any total assessment available 
concerning the projects, the assessment of the results and their 
impact is often unnecessarily treated as confidential informa-
tion, which is contrary to the transparency rules of the EU’s own 
institutions. It was also criticised that the clients involved often 
have an off-shore background and hence there is a suspicion of 
tax avoidance (or even that of corruption). In addition, the opin-
ions of locals were not adequately taken into account according 
to the analysis: in these authoritarian regimes, the government 
often not only disregards, but also resorts to violence to silence 
any opposition expressed by the local public (Antonowitz-
Cyglicka et al. 2016, 7).
There are clear differences in the evaluations made before and 
after 2011. In the period between 2007 and 2013, a mid-term 
evaluation concluded that the EIB might be a very strong tool 
of the EU, while at the same time more human and financial re-
sources would be necessary (Steering Committee 2010: 2). The 
document also highlights the importance of institutional coor-
dination both with the institutions interested in the EU’s ex-
ternal development policy, as well as other, global and regional 
development institutes.
The evaluations made after 2011 (e.g. de Laat et al. 2013), 
however, make their assessments in the light of the events of 
the Arab Spring of 2011, reflecting strongly to the apparent 
deficiencies of the EU’s development policy. To address the re-
gion’s challenges, one of the most central elements is job crea-
tion, which is in the view of most experts can best contribute to 
achieve an inclusive economic growth that is having a perceiv-
able impact for the broader society. In this respect, the result 
of the analysis of the EIB projects is a mixed one (EIB 2015b). 
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While infrastructure investments have the potential to create a 
significant number of jobs, the actual number of new jobs in the 
case of the projects examined failed to meet the expectations. 
Sustainable job creation is even more important: here, too, only 
individual projects (e.g. in the health sector) managed to create 
a significant number of long-term sustainable jobs, while the 
proportion of these were considerably less in the case of energy 
and road building projects (ibid.).
The broadening of the scope of EIB financing referred to 
above (support of new areas and sectors) and of its sources (and 
the extension of the EU guarantee) can be considered as the pri-
mary reaction to these changes. However, this is a slow process. 
As Spantig (2017, 229) also points out, the modification of the 
funding priorities is negligible, and it is hardly to be perceived 
in the target countries, in addition, the EIB focuses rather on 
the (economic) interest of the EU and not on that of the target 
countries. It is also true, that the EIB’s primary objective is not 
poverty reduction, as these objectives are supported by the EU 
from other sources – it is a question, how much the EIB should 
and could focus on such priorities.
Lesay (2013) also comes to the conclusion that unlike other 
international development institutions, the EIB has never had 
its own development policy targets. As a consequence, the pol-
icy followed by the institution was determined by the interests 
of the main shareholders, i.e. the EU member countries. In re-
cent years, with the increasing need to achieve sustainable re-
sults in the development of Southern countries, a more complex 
approach of development financing has emerged. The current 
capacities of EIB, however, are not sufficient for such deeper 
approach. That is why the cooperation with other development 
institutions of larger human resource and of broader local ex-
pertise was appreciated 
CONCLUSION
Key objective of the European Union is to promote peace, its 
values and the well-being of its peoples. To reach these goals, 
the EU needs to support and foster stability, security and 
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prosperity in the countries closest to its borders. The Southern 
Mediterranean occupies a central position in this framework, 
with recent political and social upheavals, however, the support 
of economic development became of utmost importance for the 
EU.
The European Investment Bank, which was established as 
the EU’s development bank, has become an increasingly impor-
tant player in financing and supporting the EU’s global and re-
gional engagement. The objectives to be pursued by the Bank are 
defined by the European Union’s priorities and hence the EU’s 
Global Strategy or in the context of the Mediterranean area, the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the European Neighbourhood 
Policy, or the Union for the Mediterranean shall specify the lim-
its within which the EIB provides its funding.
The analysis of the EIB lending in the Mediterranean region 
shows that it is highly concentrated: countries carrying out 
the most reforms (Tunisia, Morocco) received a proportionally 
much higher support, whilst in the Euro-Med relations less ac-
tive Algeria, or Syria that lead earlier a similar policy (and which 
is not concerned currently due to the ongoing civil war) receives 
hardly any resources. In recent years, however, Egypt has be-
come the most important partner, both regarding the number 
of contracts, as well as the amount of loan provided, despite 
European concerns over the authoritarianism of the Egyptian 
political regime.
The sectoral foci of the financial assistances have been pre-
viously the large infrastructure sectors, energy and transport. 
The power plants and motorways built with the support of the 
EIB are important elements of the economic catch-up of the 
Mediterranean countries. The change in the approach in recent 
years, however, has increased the importance of the direct fi-
nancial support of the economic operators, in particular in the 
form of loans granted to small and medium-sized enterprises 
via credit facilities provided by intermediating banks, or in a 
much lower scale by private equity operations through mutual 
funds.
With the over-36-billion-euro financial support provided for 
the region, the EIB was able to strengthen key elements in the 
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economic development process of the Mediterranean countries. 
The Bank’s activities, however, are still facing numerous criti-
cisms due to limited transparency, weak monitoring, evaluation 
procedure and the mismanagement of infringements concern-
ing the projects. This would require that the EIB’s external fi-
nancing activity which is becoming increasingly important in 
the coming years would be carried out with staff and structural 
conditions which are adequate to its growing role, and with a 
more consistent application of the EU transparency rules.
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